India, Pakistan Exchange List of Nuclear Installations

India and Pakistan exchanged, through diplomatic channels, the list of nuclear installations and facilities covered under Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities.
The exchange took place simultaneously in New Delhi and Islamabad, in accordance with the provisions of the bilateral agreement.

Key Highlights

  • The exchange is carried out every year on 1 January, as mandated by the agreement.
  • The 2026 exchange marks the 35th consecutive annual exchange, with the first exchange conducted on 1 January 1992.
  • The process has continued uninterrupted for over three decades, including during periods of high political and military tension between the two countries.
  • The exchange was confirmed by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).

What the Agreement Says

Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities
  • Signed: 31 December 1988
  • Entered into force: 27 January 1991 (after exchange of instruments of ratification)
Core Commitments

Both countries agree to:

  • Refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in any action aimed at the destruction or damage of nuclear installations or facilities in the other country.
  • Annually exchange information on nuclear installations and facilities, typically including geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude).
Installations Covered

The agreement applies to:

  • Nuclear power plants
  • Research reactors
  • Fuel fabrication units
  • Uranium enrichment facilities
  • Isotope separation plants
  • Reprocessing units
  • Sites storing significant quantities of radioactive material, whether fresh or irradiated

Why Annual Exchange Matters

  • Acts as a confidence-building measure (CBM) between two nuclear-armed neighbours.
  • Reduces the risk of accidental, miscalculated or deliberate attacks on sensitive nuclear infrastructure during crises.
  • Prevents escalation where conventional military operations could inadvertently trigger a nuclear or radiological catastrophe.
  • An attack on nuclear installations could cause:
    • Massive humanitarian harm
    • Severe environmental contamination
    • Strategic instability and escalation

Continuity Despite Crises

The exchange has continued even after major bilateral crises, including:

  • Kargil conflict (1999)
  • 2001–02 military standoff
  • 2016 Uri attack
  • 2019 Pulwama attack and Balakot air strikes

This continuity underlines its importance as a minimum risk-reduction mechanism.

Historical Context

  • Negotiated in the late 1980s, when both countries were moving towards overt nuclear capability, but before nuclear tests.
  • Reflected concerns about pre-emptive strikes on nuclear facilities in a volatile regional environment.
  • Predates the 1998 nuclear tests, after which both India and Pakistan openly declared themselves nuclear weapon states.
  • One of the earliest formal nuclear confidence-building measures between the two countries.

Limits of Agreement

  • Does not restrict nuclear weapons development, deployment or use.
  • Does not cover:
    • Missile bases
    • Command and control centres
    • Other strategic military assets linked to nuclear forces
  • Lacks verification mechanisms beyond the annual exchange of lists.

Despite these limitations, the agreement endures due to mutual recognition of catastrophic risks associated with attacks on nuclear infrastructure.

Significance

  • One of the few surviving institutionalised nuclear risk-reduction measures between India and Pakistan.
  • Demonstrates continued acknowledgement of nuclear restraint, even amid limited dialogue.
  • Serves as a rare example of sustained cooperation in the nuclear domain in South Asia.
  • Reinforces global norms against targeting civilian nuclear facilities during conflict.

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)

  • CBMs are diplomatic or military arrangements designed to reduce mistrust and prevent conflict escalation.
  • India–Pakistan CBMs include:
    • Nuclear installations agreement
    • Hotline mechanisms
    • Advance notice of ballistic missile tests

Nuclear Risk in South Asia

  • South Asia lacks a comprehensive nuclear arms control framework.
  • Agreements like this one play a disproportionately important role in preventing unintended escalation.

Connect with our Social Channels

Share With Friends

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top